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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
KATHY HALL, : 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d)(2002). 
Appellant/Defendant Kathy Hall timely petitioned for interlocutory review of a trial court 
order dated April 18, 2006. See Signed Minute Entry being appealed from at R. 180-84, 
a copy of which is in Addendum A. This Court granted Ms. Hall's petition for 
interlocutory review on the issues set forth below. See this Court's Order granting 
interlocutory review in Addendum B. 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue 1: Whether the evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing established 
probable cause to believe that Ms. Hall intentionally or knowingly allowed her child to be 
"exposed to" paraphernalia, controlled substances or chemical substances so as to justify 
bindover on one count of child endangerment where the thirteen-year-old could not see or 
access the items in the downstairs bedrooms occupied by adults and the state did not 
establish that the debris in the garage or the odor qualified as contraband under the 
statute? 
Standard of Review: The bindover standard requires that a magistrate bind a case 
over for trial if the prosecution introduces sufficient evidence to establish probable cause 
to believe that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^ J17, 137 
P.3d 787. The supreme court clarified in Virgin that magistrates may make limited 
credibility determinations in preliminary hearings and "may disregard or discount as 
incredible evidence that is not capable of supporting a reasonable belief as to an element 
of prosecutor's claim." Id. at ff24, 25. Nevertheless, magistrates cannot weigh credible 
but conflicting evidence and must limit their credibility determinations to disregarding or 
discounting evidence that cannot support a reasonable belief that the defendant 
committed the crime charged. Id Because magistrates are able to make limited 
credibility determinations, "in reviewing a magistrate's bindover decision, an appellate 
court should afford the decision limited deference." Id at [^26. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below by written motion and argument at a 
hearing held April 13, 2006. R. 36-89;10. 
Issue 2: Whether the child endangerment statute is void for vagueness as applied 
in this case where the thirteen-year-old was in the living room, away from the downstairs 
bedrooms and detached garage where items were found, and the evidence did not 
establish that the teenager could see or access any items outlawed in the statute or that 
she faced any risk of harm? 
Standard of Review: uc Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of 
law, which [are reviewed] for correctness.'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f42, 99 P.3d 
820 (further citations omitted). Statutes are presumed constitutional and a party 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute "'bearfs] the burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality.555 Green, 2004 UT 76, J^42 (quoting Greenwood v. City of N. Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991)). Moreover, "[t]he constitution tolerates a greater 
degree of vagueness in civil statutes than in criminal statutes.55 Green, 2004 UT 76, }^43 
(citing Vill. Of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion and argument held on 
April 13, 2006. R. 36-45; 210. 
TEXT OF STATUTE 
The texts of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003) and the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution are in Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state.charged Ms. Hall with one count of child endangerment, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003), and one count of possession 
of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 
(2002). R. 01-03. 
Following bindover, Ms. Hall filed a "Motion to Quash Bindover/Declare Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 Unconstitutional" and a supporting memorandum. R. 36-50. 
The trial court held a hearing on the motion on April 13, 2006. R. 210. The trial court 
entered its order denying the motion on April 18, 2006. See Signed Minute Entry in 
Addendum A. 
Ms. Hall timely petitioned this Court for interlocutory review of the bindover and 
constitutional issues, which this Court granted. See Addendum B. This appeal follows. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The state charged Ms. Hall with child endangerment and misdemeanor possession 
of paraphernalia after executing a search warrant at a house in Salt Lake County where 
Ms. Hall, other adults, and Ms. Hall's thirteen-year-old daughter were present. R. 54, 
55, 56. The evidence did not demonstrate that the thirteen-year-old girl ingested, inhaled, 
had contact with, accessed, or viewed paraphernalia, a controlled substance or a chemical 
substance, but did show items that allegedly were paraphernalia, controlled substance or 
chemical substance were found in two downstairs bedrooms and the officer smelled what 
he described as the odor of methamphetamine outside and in the detached garage, and 
found "debris" that he associated with a methamphetamine lab in the detached garage. R. 
56-60. 
Officers executed the warrant at about 4:00 p.m. on December 8, 2003. R. 54. 
The occupants of the house were in the process of moving out of the house and doors to 
all of the rooms were open and people were leaving the house when the officers arrived. 
R. 55, 57. Some people were in vehicles and others were in the house. R. 55. Kathy 
Hall was at the scene but the officer could not recall whether she was in the house or in a 
car. R. 55. Ms. Hall's thirteen-year-old daughter, Tiffany, was in the upstairs living 
room area of the house. R. 60. Tiffany was just "hanging around in the living room" 
when officers arrived, and did not appear to be helping with the move. R. 63. The 
officers detained everyone who was on the scene; the officer who testified thought seven 
people were detained. R. 55. 
Officers found a pipe on a shelf in a closet in a basement bedroom identified as 
Ms. Hall's bedroom. R. 57. The pipe was wrapped in paper or tissue and was not in 
plain view. R. 58. The pipe was located in the top of a standard sized closet above the 
hanging rod which could hold a winter coat, but was accessible from the front of the 
closet and the officer thought that the thirteen-year-old appeared tall enough to reach it. 
R. 58, 63. The pipe was never tested even though the officer thought that the pipe was 
similar to pipes which are used to ingest methamphetamine and had burn marks and a 
smoky residue inside. R. 64, 67-8. 
In another downstairs bedroom belonging to Teresa Albretson, the officers found 
methamphetamine, a package of pseudoephedrine, a scale, and packaging materials. R. 
58, 59, 65. While pseudoephedrine can be used in the production of methamphetamine, it 
is an allergy medication and the officers found only one package. R. 60, 65. The items 
were inside a transparent plastic set of drawers located in Ms. Albretson's room. R. 58. 
There was no evidence the juvenile ever lived in or entered Ms. Albretson's room; in 
fact, Tiffany's bedroom was upstairs and she was located in the upstairs living room of 
the house when officers arrived. R. 57, 60, 64. 
The officers also located "debris55 in the detached garage, including empty bottles 
of HEET, black electrical tape, stained rubber gloves, and what the officer described as 
"an overwhelming odor of a Methamphetamine lab.55 R. 59. The officers did not find 
beakers, iodine or phosphorous in the garage and the gloves were never tested and were 
not taken into evidence. R 65, 67. Nor did the officer testify that they found lab waste, 
stains, volatile chemicals or methamphetamine in the garage. According to the officer, 
HEET can be used "to break up either the pills to separate the efederin [sic] also it can be 
used to breakup the glue that is used on the striker plates and the matches to get it to 
break up the red phosphorous.55 R. 59. The officer could smell the odor outside the 
garage, but could not remember whether he could smell the odor in the house. R. 59. 
He also did not know "if there was a garage door on the side, a main door and a main 
garage door55 or whether the doors that did exist were locked or unlocked. R. 60. 
Although there was no evidence that Tiffany ingested, inhaled, touched, accessed, 
had contact with or even saw the pipe in her mother's room, the debris in the garage or 
the other items found in Ms. Albretson5s bedroom, the preliminary hearing magistrate 
bound Ms. Hall over for trial on the child endangerment count along with a misdemeanor 
count of possession of paraphernalia. R. 70-71. The trial court refused to quash the 
bindover of the child endangerment charge and denied Ms. Hall's motion to declare the 
statute unconstitutional. See Order in Addendum A. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in refusing to quash the bindover of the child endangerment 
count. The state failed to introduce sufficient evidence, without requiring speculation on 
the part of the magistrate, that Ms. Hall knowingly or intentionally permitted thirteen-
year-old Tiffany to be exposed to the items found in the house or detached garage so as to 
violate the child endangerment statute. 
There is no evidence in this case that Tiffany ingested, inhaled, accessed, saw or 
was otherwise actually "exposed to" the items found in the two basement bedrooms or 
detached garage. Because Tiffany was in the upstairs living room at the time the crime is 
alleged to have occurred and her bedroom was likewise upstairs, the evidence presented 
at the preliminary hearing failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that she was 
"exposed to" the items secreted in a closet and chest of drawers in downstairs bedrooms 
occupied by adults or the debris in the garage or odor outside. 
In addition, the evidence did not establish probable cause to believe Ms. Hall acted 
knowingly or intentionally in permitting Tiffany to be "exposed to" items that were 
hidden in a downstairs closet or secreted in a chest of drawers in a room occupied by 
another person. Moreover, the state failed to establish probable cause to believe that the 
items in the garage or the odor the officer characterized as that of a methamphetamine lab 
constituted controlled substance, chemical substance or paraphernalia as those terms are 
defined in the child endangerment statute. The trial court therefore erred in refusing to 
quash the bindover on the child endangerment count. 
The child endangerment statute is unconstitutional as applied in this case. The 
facts in this case where among other things, Ms. Hall was bound over for endangering a 
thirteen-year-old who was in an upstairs living room, away from either of the basement 
bedrooms where items were located and the detached garage which contained only 
"debris,"5 demonstrate not only that the statute fails to give notice as to what constitutes 
exposure but also that judges, officers, and prosecutors are left to decide what constitutes 
exposure and whether any risk of harm is required in order to sustain a child 
endangerment charge. 
There is no evidence that Tiffany had ever been in the downstairs bedrooms and 
even if she had, the items were secreted in drawers and a closet. Nor is there evidence 
that she faced the possibility of danger. Although the officer smelled what he 
characterized as the odor of a methamphetamine lab while outside the house, the 
evidence did not establish probable cause to believe that the odor or debris qualified as a 
chemical substance, controlled substance or paraphernalia under the child endangerment 
statute. While the magistrate bound the child endangerment charges over for trial in this 
case, in similar circumstances before this Court, it has been held that the circumstances 
do not warrant bindover. Because Ms. Hall could not have known that these 
circumstances where Tiffany was not endangered would give rise to a child 
endangerment charge and the statute does not contain adequate guidelines, the statute is 
void for vagueness under the circumstances of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. WHERE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT APPELLANT KNOWINGLY OR 
INTENTIONALLY PERMITTED THE JUVENILE TO BE "EXPOSED 
TO" CONTRABAND, THE BINDOVER SHOULD BE QUASHED 
The trial court erred in failing to dismiss the child endangerment count where the 
evidence did not establish probable cause to believe that Ms. Hall knowingly or 
intentionally allowed thirteen-year-old Tiffany to be "exposed to" a controlled substance, 
chemical substance or paraphernalia. In this case where the items were secreted in 
downstairs bedrooms occupied by adults or consisted only of "debris" or an odor, and 
Tiffany was found alone in an upstairs living room away from these items, the trial court 
erred in upholding the child endangerment count. The evidence did not establish that 
Tiffany could see or access the items or that Ms. Hall acted knowingly or intentionally in 
permitting her to be "exposed to" or endangered by the items. In addition, the evidence 
did not establish probable cause to believe that the debris in the garage or the odor 
qualified as contraband under the statute. When viewed in the light most favorable to the 
state, the evidence failed to establish probable cause; the trial court therefore should have 
quashed the bindover of the child endangerment count. 
Utah's child endangerment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 makes it a 
felony to endanger a child as outlined in the statute. Section 76-5-112.5 states in part: 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). * 
1
 Although Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 applies to children and elder adults, for the 
purposes of this brief, Appellant refers to the statute as the child endangerment statute 
and discusses the statute as it applies to children. Because the statute applies to both 
children and elder adults, any decision regarding the application of the statute to children 
would also apply to elder adults. 
The child endangerment statute allows prosecution for knowingly or intentionally 
permitting a child to be "exposed to" controlled or chemical substances or paraphernalia 
without defining of clarifying the meaning of the term "exposed to." See State v. 
Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5,^8, 128 P.3d 1223, This Court held in Nieberger, that 
although the word "exposed" is not defined in the statute, it nevertheless is sufficiently 
definite, along with the remaining language in the child endangerment statute, to uphold 
the statute against a challenge that it is void for vagueness as applied in that case. Id. at 
Tflfl 1-15. This Court reached that conclusion by employing the following definition for 
the word "expose": 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "expose" as "[t]o show publicly, to display" and 
[t]o place in a position where the object spoken of is open to danger, or 
where it is near or accessible to anything that may affect it detrimentally; 
as, to "expose" a child, or to expose oneself or another to a contagious 
disease or to danger or hazard of any kind. 
Id at HI5 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 579 (6th ed 1990)). Although this Court 
rejected Nieberger's argument that the statute required a showing of substantial risk of 
harm, it nevertheless incorporated the above definition and seemed to require that a child 
be able to see and access a controlled substance and that exposure open the child to 
danger or create the possibility that the child be affected detrimentally. Id at ffl2 n.3, 
14, 15, 
This Court's decision in Nieberger, along with rules of statutory construction 
support the notion that a child must be subjected to a risk of harm in order to be 
endangered. Since the words "exposed to" are not defined and are ambiguous, the title of 
the statute and legislative history can be considered in determining the reach of the 
statute. See Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Comm'n., 20 UTApp 164, f6,48 P.3d 
252; Estate of Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 521-22 (Utah 1997). 
The title of the statute, "Endangerment of child or elder adult," shows that the legislature 
intended that a child be endangered or face a risk of harm for the statute to apply. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-112.5.2 
The remaining alternatives for endangering a child listed in the statute likewise 
demonstrate that there must be at least the possibility of harm for there to be exposure 
under the statute since such a possibility of harm is inherent in those other alternatives. 
See generally State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, ^ f 13, 133 P.3d 396 (ejusdem generis canon 
of statutory construction "provides that when a statute contains a list of specific words 
that relate to a certain type of item and those words are followed by a general word, the 
general word should be 'construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those 
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words"'); Eaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
2005 UT 78,1HI9-10, 125 P.3d 901 (statute must not be interpreted in isolation and 
While this Court concluded in Nieberger that the legislative history showed that the 
legislature did not intend to require a substantial risk of harm to the child, the title, which 
was not removed when the legislature amended the statute, shows that legislature 
intended that a child be endangered in some way for the statute to apply. Further, Ms. 
Hall maintains that the amendment to the statute, which focused on lessening the burden 
for the prosecution of bringing in expert testimony to establish the danger caused by 
controlled substances does not show that the legislature intended to remove the 
requirement that a child be endangered; instead, unlike State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 
1315 (Utah 1983)(per curiam) where the legislature focused on deleting an element, the 
legislature in this case continued to require endangerment or a risk of harm but wanted to 
make it easier for prosecutors to prove that a child was endangered. See legislative 
history, House Bill 125, House Debates (February 25, 2002), Senate Debates (March 5, 
2002); Senate Bill 188, House Debates (February 29, 2000), Senate Debates (February 
22, 2000) in Addendum D. 
instead must be "'construed as a whole, with all of its provisions construed to be 
harmonious with each other'")- Reading the other alternatives, ingesting, inhaling, or 
having contact in conjunction with the "exposed to" language demonstrates the 
legislature intended that exposure necessarily requires there be a risk of harm to the child 
on the same level as the risk associated with the other alternatives for there to be 
exposure under the statute. Hence, although this Court in Nieberger rejected the claim 
that the statute requires a substantial risk of harm to a child, the definition of expose 
adopted by the Court, rules of statutory construction, and legislative intent suggest that 
some risk of harm is required for there to be exposure under the statute. 
This Court upheld the bindover in Nieberger, concluding that the evidence 
demonstrated the children could see and access the controlled substances. The facts 
supporting bindover in Nieberger were set forth in the opinion as follows: 
Police found controlled substances and drug paraphernalia in the living 
room, kitchen, basement, and master bedroom of Nieberger's home. 
Nieberger admitted that her husband had been selling marijuana for five 
years, that she occasionally used marijuana herself, and that marijuana and 
a pipe found in plain view in the living room belonged to her. Nieberger's 
children, two and three years old, lived in the home, and there is nothing to 
suggest they lacked the ordinary mobility, perception, or curiosity that 
could be expected of a child that age. [FN3] Nor does the record suggest 
that the children were in any way restricted from accessing the rooms 
where the various items were found. 
FN3. The State presented evidence from which it could be 
inferred that Nieberger's children could see and access 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Whether any particular 
minor or elder adult has the ability to see and access a 
particular object is a factual matter that must be resolved on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account the circumstances of 
the alleged exposure and the victim's physical abilities. 
Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^fl2. The environment of the home, including the fact that 
marijuana and paraphernalia were in plain view and were found throughout the house, 
apparently convinced this Court in Nieberger that the children "could see and access 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia" and therefore were "exposed to" those items. Id 
In contrast to Nieberger, this Court vacated a bindover for child endangerment in 
State v. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, 128 P.3d 1220 where the evidence failed to demonstrate 
that Draper exposed her nursing baby to marijuana which she had ingested. Id at ^ |14. 
In that case, officers conducted a search of Ms. Draper's home pursuant to a search 
warrant, and found marijuana and paraphernalia in a basement room and marijuana in 
Ms. Draper's bedroom. Id at [^2. In addition, Ms. Draper told officers that her husband 
had been selling marijuana for eighteen months. Id Eleven days after the search, a 
DCFS worker made an unannounced visit to the home and observed Ms. Draper nursing 
her six-month-old child. Id at Tf3. Upon being questioned, Ms. Draper acknowledged 
that she had used marijuana on two occasions since the birth of her child. Id 
Relying on two different theories, that the baby was endangered by the drugs in 
the house or alternatively that the baby was endangered by nursing, the state filed one 
count of child endangerment against Ms. Draper. Draper. 2006 UT App 6, U1P-5; see 
also Appellant's opening brief in State v. Draper, Case No. 20040879-CA at 4 filed in 
this Court. The magistrate in Draper refused to bind the case over based on the theory 
that drugs found in the basement and in a drawer in Ms. Draper's bedroom exposed the 
baby to a controlled substance, but did bind the case over on the state's nursing theory. 
See Appellant's opening brief in Draper at 4. 
On appeal, this Court held that the state's nursing theory also did not demonstrate 
probable cause to believe Ms. Draper endangered her baby and dismissed the child 
endangerment charge. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, ^[13-14. Draper demonstrates not only 
that the state's nursing theory does not sustain a bindover for child endangerment but also 
that facts which included finding marijuana and paraphernalia in the basement along with 
marijuana in a drawer in the bedroom and an admission by the defendant that she had 
used marijuana and that her husband sold marijuana, do not establish probable cause to 
believe that the baby was "exposed to" the marijuana and drug paraphernalia. In other 
words, while the appellate decision in Draper focused on the state's nursing theory, the 
reported facts regarding the drugs and paraphernalia found in the house also show in that 
case more than the existence of drugs in rooms where a child might be present was 
required to support the charge. 
Additionally, Draper like Nieberger seems to require the possibility of danger to 
the child in order to bind a defendant over for trial on a child endangerment charge. 
While this Court spoke of the child's ability to see and access controlled substances in 
Nieberger, it focused on "[t]he presence of marijuana in Draper's breast milk at the time 
she nursed [her baby]" in determining whether there was probable cause to believe 
Draper exposed her child to a controlled substance. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, ^[13. 
Without expert testimony that Draper's breast milk was likely to be contaminated by a 
controlled substance, this Court was unwilling to conclude that there was probable cause 
to believe that the child was "exposed to" controlled substance. IdL This Court's 
conclusion that the state did not establish probable cause to believe that the child was 
"exposed to5' controlled substance when he nursed further demonstrates this Court 
requires that the child have access to the controlled substance and be exposed to danger 
in order to sustain a charge for child endangerment. 
As in Nieberger and Draper, the magistrate apparently bound the present case over 
under the "exposed to" language. R. 70-71. Since there is no evidence in this case that 
Tiffany ingested, inhaled or had contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance 
or drug paraphernalia, the "exposed to5' language is the only language of the statute 
which even arguably applies. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2). But the presence of 
a thirteen year old in a house where paraphernalia or drugs are found in the private 
bedrooms of two adults and debris and odor the officers associated with a meth lab are 
found in a detached garage and outside are not sufficient to show that Ms. Hall 
intentionally or knowingly permitted Tiffany to be "exposed to" controlled substances, 
chemical substances or paraphernalia as defined in the child endangerment statute. 
Regardless of whether the statute requires a risk of harm, the state failed to establish 
probable cause to believe Tiffany was "exposed to" any of the items outlined in the 
statute. The marshaled evidence supporting the bindover of the three child endangerment 
charges is as follows: 
1. Detective Wester was employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office 
and had been assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit for less than 
two years. R. 53, 181. During that time, he had "received training on 
narcotics" and "on Clan Labs." R. 54. 
2. On December 8, 2003, officers had obtained a search warrant to search a 
house located at 5386 Silverton Drive in Salt Lake County based on 
information that "there was a possible meth lab" and "drug dealing at the 
location." R. 54. Ms. Hall was "the primary target" of the investigation. 
R. 55. 
3. When officers arrived at about 4:00 p.m., the occupants of the house were 
in the process of moving and people were leaving the house. R. 54-55. 
Officers detained seven people. R. 55. 
4. Ms. Hall's thirteen year old daughter, Tiffany, was in the upstairs living 
room of the house when officers arrived. R. 56, 60. Tiffany's bedroom 
was also upstairs. R, 64. Tiffany appeared to be mobile and was "just 
hanging around in the living room" when officers arrived; she did not 
appear to be helping with the move. R. 56, 63. 
5. Ms. Hall's bedroom was in the basement. R. 57. In that bedroom, the 
officers found a glass pipe similar to the types of pipes used to ingest 
methamphetamine. R. 57-8. The pipe was wrapped in tissue and located 
on a shelf on the top of a closet. R. 58, 63. The shelf was above a hanging 
rod which could hold a winter coat, but the officer thought the thirteen-
year-old was tall enough to reach it. R. R. 58, 63. The pipe was never 
tested even though the officer testified that it had burn marks and a white, 
smoky residue inside. R. 57-8, 64, 67-8. 
6. In another downstairs bedroom belonging to Teresa Albretson, the officers 
found methamphetamine, a package of pseudoephedrine, a scale, and 
packaging materials. R. 58, 59, 65. Pseudoephedrine can be used in the 
production of methamphetamine, but it is an allergy medication; officers 
found only one package of pseudoephedrine. R. 60, 65. The items were 
located in a transparent, three set of drawers in Ms. Albretson's room. R. 
58. No evidence was presented that Tiffany had ever been in that room.3 
7. The occupants were in the process of moving out of the house when 
officers arrived and all of the doors were opened. R. 55, 57. When asked 
whether he noticed doors or locks, the officer responded that the doors were 
open without answering whether there were locks on the doors. R. 57. 
8. The officers also located "debris" in the detached garage, including empty 
bottles of "Heat," black electrical tape, stained rubber gloves, and an odor 
that Officer Wester characterized as the odor of a methamphetamine lab. 
R.59. "Heat" can be used "to break up either the pills to separate the 
efederin [sic] also it can be used to breakup the glue that is used on the 
striker plates and the matches to get it to break up the red phosphorous." R. 
59. The officers did not find beakers, iodine or phosphorous and the rubber 
gloves were never tested or taken into evidence. R. 65, 67. The officer's 
3 The findings refer to Ms. Albretson as Ms. Hall's sister. R. 181, 182. Since evidence 
that Ms. Albretson was Ms. Hall's sister was not presented at the preliminary hearing, 
this aspect of the findings is clearly erroneous. See generally State v. Humphrey, 2006 
UT App 221, TJ15, 138 P.3d 590 (appellate court disregards trial court's factual findings if 
they are clearly erroneous.) 
explanation for failing to test the gloves was that "byproducts of 
Methamphetamine are potentially carcinogenic, they are definitely 
hazardous waste and we cannot take them into evidence." R. 67. The 
officer could smell the odor outside, but could not remember whether he 
could smell the odor inside the house. R. 59. He also did not know how 
many doors the garage had or whether those doors were locked. R. 60. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that bindover is not appropriate in 
the absence of credible evidence supporting every element of the charge and also when 
the evidence presented creates no more than speculation that the crime might have been 
committed. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, f21 (citing inter alia State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 
1H[l4-l7,3P.3d725). 
. . . magistrates may decline bindover if the prosecution fails to 
present sufficiently credible evidence on at least one element of the 
crime. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, U 15 , 20 P.3d 300. Moreover, 
magistrates are free to decline bindover where the facts presented by 
the prosecution provide no more than a basis for speculation - - as 
opposed to providing a basis for a reasonable belief. See State v. 
Hester, 2000 UT App 159, HI 14-17, 3 P.3d 725. 
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^21. Although the child witness in Virgin said that the defendant 
"put his finger in her bottom," and that "it hurt when he did but he took it out quickly" 
(Id. at TJ3) the Supreme Court upheld the magistrate's refusal to bind the case over for 
trial. Id at ffi[25, 35-38. Focusing on whether it was "reasonable" to believe the child 
had been sexually abused given all of the evidence, the Supreme Court concluded the 
magistrate was within his discretion in determining the evidence did not support a 
bindover. Id. Hence, while the child's testimony in Virgin covered all of the elements, 
the Supreme Court nevertheless made it clear that bindover was not appropriate because 
it was not reasonable to believe that the crime had occurred. 
Moreover, in Hester, cited favorably in Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^[21, this Court made 
it clear that bindover is not appropriate when the state's case is based on speculation. 
Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ^ f 14. In that case, the defendant told an undercover officer he 
had cocaine, took a twenty dollar bill from the officer, then told the officer to wait. Id at 
f^ 13. Rather than waiting to see whether the defendant returned with cocaine or simply 
left with the twenty dollars, officers immediately arrested the defendant. Because the 
state's claim that Hester would return with cocaine was merely speculation, this Court 
concluded that the evidence did not "support a reasonable inference that Hester actually 
intended to arrange for the distribution of a controlled substance - as opposed to just 
stealing [the officer's] money," Id at ^4. Because the evidence did not support a 
reasonable belief that Hester committed the crime of distribution of controlled substance 
rather than theft, this Court held that bindover on distribution was not appropriate. 
Just as the evidence in Hester and Virgin failed to establish a reasonable belief that 
the defendants in those cases committed the crimes with which they were charged, the 
evidence in this case fails to establish a reasonable belief that Ms. Hall intentionally or 
knowingly permitted Tiffany to be "exposed to" a chemical substance, controlled 
substance or paraphernalia as defined by the child endangerment statute. After the state's 
evidence was reviewed as a whole, the magistrate was required to speculate as to whether 
Tiffany had been downstairs and if so, whether she had been in the bedrooms and seen or 
accessed the items secreted in Ms. Albretson's chest of drawers or Ms. Hall's closet. The 
magistrate was also left to speculate whether Ms. Hall recognized the odor outside her 
home as the odor that emanates from a methamphetamine lab, whether Tiffany had ever 
smelled that odor, whether the odor presented any danger and whether the odor or any of 
the debris qualified as a chemical substance, controlled substance or paraphernalia under 
the statute. In this case, where Tiffany was located in the living room, away from the 
downstairs bedrooms and detached garage, the evidence did not establish that she was 
exposed to the items found in those places. 
First, the evidence failed to establish probable cause to believe that Tiffany was 
exposed to any of the items found in the downstairs bedrooms or outside the house. The 
time at which the state alleges this crime to have occurred appears to be the time at which 
the search warrant was issued. R. 1-3. At that time, Tiffany was in the upstairs living 
room where she could not see or access anything in the downstairs bedrooms, detached 
garage, or outside the house. R. 56, 60. She therefore was not "exposed to" those items 
as required by the statute and Nieberger. See Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5,^12; Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-112.5. 
In addition, Tiffany was not "exposed to" the pipe found in Ms. Hall's downstairs 
bedroom because the pipe was not located in a place where it could be seen or accessed 
and did not present any danger. R. 57-8, 63, In fact, the pipe was wrapped in tissue and 
placed on an upper shelf in the closet. R. 58, 63. While it appeared to the officer to be 
similar to pipes he had seen used to smoke methamphetamine, he did not have it tested. 
R. 57-8, 64, 67-7. Under these circumstances where the pipe was not in plain view nor 
easily accessible and the state has not demonstrated that it contained residue, the fact that 
Tiffany might have been tall enough to reach it does not establish that she was "exposed 
to" drug paraphernalia as defined by the statute. 
The evidence likewise failed to establish probable cause to believe that Tiffany 
was "exposed to" the items found in the chest of drawers in Ms. Albretson's room or the 
detached garage. Although the chest of drawers was transparent, the officer did not 
testify that the methamphetamine or packet of pills was unwrapped and visible, nor was 
there any evidence Tiffany had access to those items, which were located in a drawer in 
the private living quarters of an adult. R. 58, 59. The garage had doors and the officer 
had no idea whether they were locked or unlocked. R. 60. The testimony therefore failed 
to establish that Tiffany could see and access the contraband items in the garage. 
Second, even if the evidence had shown that Tiffany could see and access the 
items, the state failed to establish probable cause to believe that Ms. Hall knowingly or 
intentionally permitted that to occur. The pipe located in Ms. HalPs bedroom was the 
only item Ms. Hall allegedly possessed. The pipe was wrapped in tissue and placed on an 
upper shelf, indicating an intent to hide the item and make it inaccessible to others. R. 
58, 63. Hence, the location of the pipe and the fact that it was wrapped in tissue 
demonstrated not only that Tiffany could not see and access it, but also that Ms. Hall did 
not knowingly or intentionally permit her to do so. 
Nor do the circumstances demonstrate probable cause to believe Ms. Hall 
knowingly or intentionally permitted Tiffany to be "exposed to" any of the items secreted 
in the drawers in Ms. Albretson's bedroom or in the detached garage, or to the odor 
outside. Case law demonstrates that when contraband is found on premises occupied by 
more than one person, it cannot be presumed that the defendant "knew of or possessed" 
the contraband. State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. 
Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985). Because Ms. Hall did not have exclusive or even 
constructive possession of the items in Ms. Albretson's bedroom or the detached garage, 
"it may not be inferred that [she] had knowledge of the presence of the [items] or had 
control, so that no submissible case is made." State v. Kuhn, 115 S.W.3d 845, 852 (Mo. 
App. 2003) (further citation omitted). 
Because the evidence fails to demonstrate that Ms. Hall had "the ability and the 
intent to exercise dominion and control" over the items found in Ms. Albretson's room, it 
likewise fails to show that Ms. Hall knowingly or intentionally permitted Tiffany to be 
exposed to those items. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388; see also Kuhn, 115 S.W.3d at 852. The 
items in Ms. Albretson's room were put away in drawers where they were not easily 
accessible and there is no evidence that Ms. Hall knew the items were there, especially in 
light of the fact that they were inside a chest of drawers in someone else's bedroom. 
Since the evidence failed to establish "a sufficient nexus between the accused and the 
[items] to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the [items]" (Fox, 709 P.2d at 319), it failed to 
establish that Ms. Hall had knowledge of those items or that she knowingly or 
intentionally permitted Tiffany to be exposed to them. 
The evidence also fails to demonstrate probable cause to believe that Ms. Hall 
was aware of the debris in the garage or the odor or that she intentionally or knowingly 
permitted Tiffany to be exposed to them. Nothing suggests that Ms. Hall was aware of 
the debris in the detached garage or the odor outside or had knowledge that the debris in 
the garage qualified as contraband under the child endangerment statute. Nor does the 
evidence demonstrate that had she been aware of the odor, she would have known that it 
was caused by a methamphetamine lab or that the odor emanated from the garage rather 
than a neighbor's house or car. Because the garage had doors that may or may not have 
been locked, the evidence did not demonstrate that Ms. Hall had entered the garage or 
that she had permitted Tiffany to do so or to be endangered by the debris in the garage. 
Third, the state failed to establish probable cause to believe that the debris in the 
garage or the odor qualified as a chemical substance, controlled substance or 
paraphernalia under the child endangerment statute. The child endangerment statute 
defines a chemical substance as "a substance intended to be used as a precursor in the 
manufacture of a controlled substance.55 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.1(a). Intent under 
this section may be demonstrated by the substance's use, quantity, manner of storage or 
proximity to other prescursors, or to manufacturing equipment." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
112.5 (2). The debris found in the detached garage, which consisted of empty bottles of 
HEET, black electrical tape, stained rubber gloves and an odor that the officer 
characterized as the odor of a methamphetamine lab, does not fit this definition since 
none of the items located in the detached garage was "a substance intended to be used as 
a precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other chemical intended 
to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
112.5(l)(a). In other words, none of the items was a chemical substance let alone a 
chemical substance used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Since the state did 
not test the gloves and the HEET bottles were empty, the state failed to establish probable 
cause to believe these items contained a chemical or controlled substance. 
Additionally, in the absence of expert testimony, the state failed to establish 
probable cause to believe that the odor qualified as a chemical or controlled substance 
under the statute. Like the question of whether marijuana passes through breast milk to a 
nursing baby, the question of whether the odor associated with a methamphetamine lab 
passes a controlled or chemical substance to a person inside a house is "of sufficient 
scientific complexity to require expert testimony.55 Draper, 2006 UT App 6, 1J10. In the 
absence of such expert testimony, the state failed to demonstrate that the odor outside and 
in the garage exposed Tiffany to a controlled or chemical substance. See generally 
Kuhn, 115 S.W. 3d at 852 (odor of methamphetamine lab and lab equipment did not 
establish child endangerment). 
Nor do any of the items or odor qualify as controlled substance or drug 
paraphernalia as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2 (Supp. 2006) and 58-37a-3 (2002). 
The child endangerment statute incorporates the definitions for controlled substance and 
paraphernalia found in Title 58. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-112.5(l)(c) & (d). Controlled 
substances are defined as "a drug or substance included in Schedules I, II, III, IV of 
Section 58-37-4, and also includes a drug or substance included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, 
or V of the federal Controlled Substances A c t . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(f)(i). 
Drug paraphernalia is defined in Section 58-37a-3 as "any equipment, product, or 
material used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package, 
repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise produce a 
controlled substance into the human body . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3. Without 
testing and expert testimony, the evidence failed to establish probable cause to believe 
that the debris of odor fit within these definitions. See Draper, 2006 UT App 6, ^ 9. 
Moreover, the "debris" could be found in any ordinary garage and fails to 
demonstrate the existence of an active methamphetamine lab in the past or at the time 
charged in the Information. HEET is ordinarily found in a garage since it is normally 
used as "a gasoline antifreeze and water remover" used to make "cold engines start." 
http://www.goldeagle.com/heet/index.htm. HEET "contains special additives and 
methanol" and two bottles are used for a gas tank that holds twenty gallons of gas. Id. 
Empty bottles of HEET in a Utah garage in December is therefore a common occurrence 
independent of methamphetamine production. Stained gloves likewise could be found in 
most garages, especially garages where persons are adding HEET to car engines, and do 
not create probable cause even in the presence of the empty HEET containers to 
demonstrate that an active methamphetamine lab had been in the garage.4 The black 
electrical tape when considered in conjunction with the empty HEET bottles and stained 
gloves does not raise the evidence to the probable cause level since black electrical tape 
can be found in most households or garages. See Kuhn, 115 S.W.3d at 851 n.3 (presence 
of common household item without more does not establish child endangerment charge). 
4
 Despite the officer's testimony that the gloves were not tested because it might be 
dangerous to do so, hazardous materials associated with methamphetamine production 
and methamphetamine itself are routinely tested, using appropriate procedures to ensure 
the safety of the persons conducting the tests. See e ^ State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 
122P.3d639. ' 
Nor does the purported odor of a methamphetamine lab demonstrate that the 
evidence found in the garage or outside established probable cause to believe Tiffany was 
exposed to a controlled or chemical substance or paraphernalia. In the absence of expert 
testimony, it is impossible to determine whether an odor presents any risk of harm or can 
be characterized as a chemical or controlled substance. Additionally, there are four 
possible smells, some of which might appear similar to the smells found in ordinary 
garages, which are associated with meth labs, http:// 
www.epi.state.nc.us/epi.oii/pdf/methlab.pdf. Those four odors are: (1) an etherlike odor 
commonly associated with hospitals, (2) a solvent like odor found in autobody shops, (3) 
a vinegar like odor, and (4) an ammonia like odor that is sharp and irritating like glass 
cleaner or wet diapers. Id. While this officer who had a little over one year experience in 
drug detection at the time of the incident said that the odor smelled like a 
methamphetamine lab, that testimony does not add to the probable cause determination 
not only because of the lack of expert testimony as to whether odor qualifies as a 
chemical substance or causes any potential harm, but also because of the lack of specific 
description of the smell.5 Given the fact that the officer did not testify that there were 
stains, toxic waste, leftover chemicals or equipment, or methamphetamine in the garage, 
the odor, in the absence of more specific description and scientific evidence, fails to 
demonstrate probable cause to believe that Tiffany was exposed to a controlled or 
5
 The officer testified at the preliminary hearing on October 28, 2004 that he had been in 
narcotics detection for almost two years at that time. R. 52, 53. The incident in this case 
occurred almost eleven months earlier on December 8, 2003. R. 53. The officer 
therefore had been in his position for about a year at the time of this incident. 
chemical substance. See generally Kuhn, 115 S.W.3d at 847-51 (no actual risk of harm 
where child was present in mobile home that contained odor of chemicals associated with 
methamphetamine production but no dangerous equipment and "no dangerous fume 
producing elements used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were found.") 
Fourth, as previously outlined, there is no evidence that Tiffany faced any risk of 
harm. Tiffany was in the living room, away from any of the alleged contraband items, at 
the time the crime is alleged to have been committed. R. 56, 60. The pipe in Ms. Hall's 
bedroom was secreted in the closet and never tested for residue; the evidence therefore 
fails to demonstrate that the pipe posed any danger to Tiffany. The evidence also failed 
to demonstrate that the items in Ms. Allbretson's room or the garage, or the odor outside, 
presented the possibility of harm to Tiffany. The items in Ms. Albretson's room were put 
away in a chest of drawers in a room occupied by someone other than Ms. Hall. R. 58. 
The bottles of HEET were empty and the gloves were never tested to establish whether 
the stains were from a chemical or controlled substance or ordinary use in a garage or 
garden. R. 65, 67. Moreover, the state failed to present any evidence that an odor 
associated with a methamphetamine lab would create a risk of harm. 
Under the circumstances in this case, regardless of whether a risk of harm is 
required, the state did not present sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable belief, 
absent speculation, that Ms. Hall intentionally or knowingly permitted Tiffany to be 
"exposed to" a controlled substance, chemical substance or paraphernalia so as to violate 
the child endangerment statute. The evidence did not establish that Tiffany could see or 
access any items outlawed by the statute or that Ms. Hall intentionally or knowingly 
allowed that to happen. In addition, the evidence did not demonstrate that the odor or 
debris in the garage qualified as items outlawed by the child endangerment statute. 
Moreover, the evidence did not demonstrate that Tiffany faced any risk of harm under the 
circumstances encountered by the officers when they entered the home. Since the gaps in 
the evidence cannot be filled by speculation, the bindover on the child endangerment 
charge should have been quashed. 
POINT II. THE CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS SINCE IT FAILS TO GIVE NOTICE AND ALLOWS FOR 
ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT WHEN A JUVENILE HAS NOT SEEN OR 
ACCESSED CONTRABAND BUT IS LOCATED IN A HOUSE WHERE 
SUCH ITEMS ARE FOUND 
The child endangerment statute is void for vagueness in violation of due process 
since it fails to give notice that the circumstances of this case would subject a person to a 
child endangerment charge, and allows prosecutors, police officers and judges unguided 
discretion to decide the reach of the statute, thereby allowing arbitrary and discriminatory 
application in a case such as this one. The words "exposed to" in the statute are not 
sufficiently defined so as to clarify what constitutes exposure and this Court's decisions 
fail to remedy the uncertainty of the statute, especially under the circumstances of this 
case. The application of the "exposed to" language in this and other cases, including the 
uncertainty as to the level of the risk of harm, if any, that is required, shows not only that 
the statute fails to give notice that the circumstances of this case would give rise to a 
child endangerment charge but also leaves it to judges, prosecutors, and police officers to 
decide what constitutes exposure. Because the statute is unconstitutionally vague, the 
statute should be invalidated or, at the very least, the "exposed to" language should be 
stricken. 
Principles of procedural due process prohibit the application of a statute that is 
vague. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ 43, 99 P.3d 820, 830-31. A penal statute is 
unconstitutionally vague when it fails to "'define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" Id. (quoting 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (further citation omitted)). 
The notice aspect of the vagueness doctrine requires that a statute be invalidated 
when the statute "fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to 
understand what conduct it prohibits[.]" City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 
(1999). The purpose of this aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is to enable the ordinary 
citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law." Id. at 58. A loitering statute that made 
it a crime to "remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" "failfed] to give an 
ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is permitted" in Morales 
and therefore violated this first aspect of the vagueness doctrine. IdL at 60-1. A child 
endangerment statute that applied to a person "who [p]laces [a] dependent in a situation 
that may endanger his life or health," thereby allowing prosecution in certain 
circumstances where there was only a possibility of harm, also violated this first aspect of 
the vagueness doctrine because it failed to give notice to persons of ordinary intelligence 
of the conduct proscribed by the statute. State v. Downey, 476 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ind. 
1985). 
Both aspects of the vagueness doctrine are important and bear on whether the 
prohibitions of the statute are sufficiently defined so as to comply with due process. See 
Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting 
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357). While the notice aspect is important, the vagueness 
requirement that the legislature establish minimal guidelines so as to protect against 
arbitrary enforcement is of even greater importance, especially in the criminal context. 
See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58; Commonwealth v. Carter, 462 S.E. 2d 582, 584 (Va. 
Ct.App. 1995). 
A loitering statute that does not contain guidelines for enforcement and instead 
'provides absolute discretion to police officers to decide what activities constitute 
loitering'" violates the second aspect of the vagueness doctrine. Morales, 527 U.S. at 61 
(citations omitted). Likewise, a child endangerment statute that allows prosecution when 
there may be a possibility of risk of physical harm to a child violates the second part of 
the vagueness test since it allows officers to decide what conduct may create a possibility 
of harm. Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 585. The child endangerment statute at issue in Carter 
was vague because it failed to establish minimal guidelines for law enforcement, thereby 
leaving it to law enforcement to decide what conduct might create a possibility of harm 
so as to give rise to a child endangerment charge. Id. 
Utah's child endangerment statute violates both aspects of the vagueness doctrine 
under the circumstances of this case in that it fails to give notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence that the circumstances here would give rise to a child endangerment charge 
and also because it fails to provide minimal guidelines for law enforcement, thereby 
allowing for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
112.5. The statute allows prosecution for permitting a child to be "exposed to" controlled 
or chemical substances or paraphernalia without defining the meaning of "exposed to." 
See Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^[15. While a risk of harm is inherent in the other acts 
outlined by the statute, inhaling or ingesting a controlled substance, chemical substance 
or paraphernalia or having contact with these items, the statute is not clear as to the level 
of potential harm, if any, which must exist for there to be exposure or whether the child 
must actually be endangered in order to support a prosecution under the statute. 
Moreover, by failing to require a substantial risk of harm, Utah's statute suffers from the 
same flaws as the statutes at issue in Carter and Downey by failing to give notice or 
guidelines as what conduct the statute proscribes. 
This Court's decisions in Nieberger and Draper also do not sufficiently define the 
term "exposed to" so as to guide law enforcement as to what is required in order to 
expose a child to a controlled substance so as to give rise to a charge of child 
endangerment Indeed, while this Court rejected the argument that a substantial risk of 
danger is required, it seemed to nevertheless require that a child be able to see and access 
the controlled substance and embraced a definition that necessarily includes a 
requirement that the child be endangered. See Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^ [11-15; 
discussion in Point I supra at 10-15. Similarly, in Draper, this Court seemed to require 
evidence that the child actually be endangered by nursing in order to sustain the charge. 
See Draper, 2006 UT App 6, ^13. This lack of clarity as to what level of risk, if any, is 
required under the statute fails to give notice that a thirteen-year-old located in the living 
room of a home where officers find items secreted in downstairs bedrooms and debris in 
a detached garage along with an odor associated with a methamphetamine lab would give 
rise to a child endangerment charge. 
This Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute against a vagueness challenge 
as applied to the facts in Nieberger. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^[14-18. Because this 
Court concluded that a person of ordinary intelligence would know that controlled 
substances and paraphernalia found throughout the house in areas that children could see 
and access would give rise to prosecution under the statute, the statute did not offend the 
first aspect of the vagueness test under the Nieberger facts. Id. at f 14-15. In addition, 
this Court concluded that the statute did not allow for arbitrary enforcement under the 
facts of Nieberger since "Nieberger's alleged acts of allowing her children to see and 
potentially access controlled substances and paraphernalia fall squarely within the 
statute's purview, ieaving no room for law enforcement officials to decide, in their 
discretion, that the statute's provisions should not apply.'" Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, 
117. 
By contrast, the courts in Carter and Downey held that the child endangerment 
statutes in those cases were unconstitutionally vague because they allowed prosecution 
for acts that only "may" endanger a child, thereby failing to give notice as to what acts 
might endanger a child or allowing police officers, judges and prosecutors to decide 
whether an act "may" create a possibility of harm to a child. For example, in Carter, the 
Virginia statute which allowed prosecution for child endangerment when a person 
"willfully or negligently [ ] cause [s] or permit[s] [a] child to be placed in a situation that 
its life, health or morals may be endangered" was unconstitutionally vague as applied. 
Carter, 462 N.E.2d at 585. The court reasoned that the language of the statute, including 
the use of the word "may" allowed for arbitrary enforcement because it "criminalizes any 
act which presents a 'possibility' of physical or moral harm to the child." Id. at 585 
(emphasis in the original). Because the statute left it to police and prosecutors to decide 
whether a given activity may create a possibility of harm, the statute was 
unconstitutional: 
Thus, guided by subjectivity and personal predilection, police and 
prosecutors in this instance concluded that the factually diverse conduct of 
each defendant possibly endangered the life, health, or morals of minors 
then in their custody. This determination may have resulted from 
individual moral imperatives, unique perspectives on the specific conduct, 
or defendant's mere status. Whatever the motivation and however well-
intentioned, the vague and inclusive statutory language clearly failed to 
adequately inform law enforcement of the precise conduct prohibited by 
[the statute], thereby accommodating arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. 
Id. at 585 (footnote and citations omitted). 
Like the statute in Carter, Utah's child endangerment statute allows police, 
prosecutors, and judges to decide whether any possibility of harm is required and if so, 
what level of possibility, as well as whether a juvenile is "exposed to" contraband items 
when found in the same house where such items are located. As was the situation in 
Carter, the determination that the circumstances in this case gave rise to a child 
endangerment charge may have been based on the moral perspective of the officer or 
judge, or a distaste for Ms. Hall's lifestyle rather than on guidelines articulated by the 
legislature. Additionally, the definition of "expose" embraced by this Court in Nieberger, 
2006 UT App 5, TI15, which includes situations that may affect a child detrimentally, 
suffers from the same unconstitutional flaw as the statute in Carter. By not requiring a 
substantial risk of harm to a child, Utah's statute suffers from the same flaw as the statute 
in Carter as is evident in this case where there is no evidence that the thirteen-year-old 
faced a risk of harm from the debris in the garage or the items secreted in the bedrooms, 
let alone a substantial risk of harm. 
The Indiana Supreme Court reached a result similar to that in Carter, holding that 
Indiana's child endangerment was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Downey, 476 
N.E.2d at 123. The Indiana statute allowed a person to be prosecuted for child 
endangerment when he or she "[p] laces the dependent in a situation that may endanger 
his life or health." Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 123. The defendant argued that the statute 
was "not specific enough to inform persons of ordinary intelligence of the proscribed 
conduct because every situation carries with it some degree of danger." Id. Because the 
statute allowed prosecution for action that "may endanger" a child and did not require 
that the conduct give rise to "a danger which is actual and appreciable," the court 
concluded that the statute left persons of ordinary intelligence "to guess about the 
statute's meaning and [ ] differ as to its application." Id Similarly, Utah's statute which 
allows prosecution for permitting a child to be "exposed to" a controlled substance or 
paraphernalia, including situations that may affect a child detrimentally (Nieberger, 2006 
UT App 5, f 15), leaves a person of ordinary intelligence to guess as to the statute's 
meaning and to apply the statute disparately, especially in a case such as this one where 
there is no evidence that the teenager was able to see or access any of the items 
delineated in Utah's child endangerment statute or otherwise faced any possibility of 
danger, let alone a substantial risk of danger. 
Like the courts in Carter and Downey, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that its 
child endangerment statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied in State v. Scruggs, 
905 A.2d 241, 279 Conn. 698, 725 (Conn. 2006). In Scruggs, the state charged the 
defendant with child endangerment based on the extremely cluttered and messy condition 
of defendant's home, alleging that this condition endangered the mental health of 
Scruggs' twelve-year-old son who committed suicide. Id at 700-02. The defendant 
challenged the constitutionality of the statute as applied to her, claiming that the statute 
"did not provide her with adequate notice of the line dividing lawful conduct from 
unlawful conduct in this context." LI at 713. The court concluded that the statute was 
vague, in violation of due process, since it did not give notice "that the conditions in the 
apartment posed an unlawful risk to the mental health of a child" in violation of the 
statute. Id. at 719. Because the statute was unconstitutionally applied to Scruggs, the 
court vacated the conviction. IcL at 725. 
Utah's child endangerment statute is constitutionally flawed like the Virginia, 
Indiana and Connecticut statutes in that it allows prosecution for child endangerment 
without indicating what level of risk of harm, if any, is required. Because Utah's child 
endangerment statute allows prosecution for permitting a child to be "exposed to" a 
controlled substance, chemical substance or paraphernalia without clarifying whether any 
possibility of harm is required, law enforcement, prosecutors and judges are left to decide 
whether any risk of harm is required and to decide what constitutes exposure to a 
controlled substance, chemical substance or paraphernalia. This is especially true in a 
case such as this where there is no evidence that the child actually saw or accessed the 
controlled substance, chemical substance or paraphernalia or was otherwise endangered 
by the items or faced any possibility of harm from them. Additionally, because Utah's 
statute allows prosecution when a child is open to danger or "near or accessible to 
anything that may affect it detrimentally," (Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, <f 15), Utah's 
statute suffers from constitutional deficiencies very similar to those in the Virginia, 
Indiana and Connecticut statutes in that the level of danger, if any, required for violation 
of the statute is not clear. 
The application of the statute in this case further demonstrates the vagueness of 
Utah's child endangerment statute as applied. The Information shows that the crime of 
child endangerment allegedly occurred on December 8, 2003, the date on which the 
search warrant was executed. R. 1-3. At that time, Tiffany was alone in the upstairs 
living room. The pipe, the only item allegedly possessed by Ms, Hall, was in Ms. Hall's 
downstairs bedroom, wrapped in tissue and placed on the upper shelf of the closet where 
it was not in plain view. Although the officer thought Tiffany might have been tall 
enough to reach the pipe, there was no evidence Tiffany had been in the room or seen or 
accessed the pipe. Moreover, the pipe was never tested so the risk, if any, that might 
have existed had Tiffany entered the room, searched the closet and located the pipe was 
not established., 
Additionally, the facts in Draper, when compared to the facts of this case, 
demonstrate the standardless sweep of this statute and its potential for arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Although marijuana and paraphernalia were found in a 
basement room in that case, the state was not able to sustain a bindover on the charge that 
Ms. Draper endangered her child. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, [^2. In addition, this Court 
held that the evidence did not sustain a bindover on the state's theory that Ms. Draper had 
exposed her child to controlled substance through nursing because the state had not 
presented evidence that the controlled substance would pass to the child through nursing. 
Id. at fl 1. By contrast, the trial court in this case upheld a bindover when there is no 
evidence that any of the debris or odor qualify as a controlled substance, chemical 
substance or paraphernalia or would affect Tiffany in any way, nor any evidence that she 
could see or access the items in the bedrooms. 
The inconsistent and standardless application of the statute within the context of 
this case as well as when compared with the facts of Draper and Niebereger demonstrates 
the vagueness of the child endangerment statute and requires that the statute be 
invalidated or, at the very least, that the "exposed to" language be stricken. When a 
statute is unconstitutionally vague and is "'not reasonably susceptible to a limiting 
instruction,'" the statute must be invalidated. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 51 (citation 
omitted). In interpreting a statute to meet constitutional requirements, this Court must 
further the legislative intent and, in so doing, cannot rewrite the statute. In re I.M.L., 
2002 UT 110, ^ 25, 61 P.3d 1038. On the other hand, if the statute can be given a 
narrowing construction or if severing a portion of the statute would do away with 
constitutional infirmities, a court can either strike portions of the language or construe the 
statute so that it fits within constitutional requirements. See Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 122-
3 (construing statute narrowly to meet constitutional requirements); Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 
585 (striking portion of child endangerment statute that was unconstitutionally vague). 
In order to comply with due process and excise the vagueness of this statute, this 
Court should at the very least strike the "exposed to" language. Moreover, because the 
statute is unclear as to whether risk of harm is required and if so, what level, the statute as 
a whole should be invalidated. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Kathy Hall, by and through counsel, Joan Watt and Shannon 
Romero, respectfully requests that this Court hold that Utah's child endangerment statute 
violates due process as applied in this case or, in the alternative, that the state failed to 
establish probable cause to support the child endangerment charge. 
SUBMITTED this _3_ day of November, 2006. 
\ JftLA. I. (AL?Y 
JOAN C.WATT 
SHANON ROMERO 
Attorneys for Appellant/Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Joan C. Watt, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the original 
and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th 
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah 
Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. 
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah, this ^ __ day of November, 2006. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of November, 2006. 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
State of Utah, : 
vs. : Minute Entry 
Kathy Hall, : Case No. 041100373 
The matter before the Court is defendant's Motion to Quash 
Bindover/Declare Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-112.5 
Unconstitutional. The preliminary hearing in this case was held on 
October 28, 2004. Since the preliminary hearing the Utah Court of 
Appeals has addressed the constitutionality of Section 76-5-112.5 
in State vs. Nieberger. 
Because the Utah Court of Appeals has found the statute to be 
constitutional, that portion of Defendant's Motion is denied. 
The Court will address the remaining portion of the Motion that 
seeks to quash the Bindover, because there "is insufficient 
evidence to demonstrate probable cause that Ms. Hall violated the 
child endangerment statute." This Court did not hear the 
preliminary hearing, but has reviewed the transcript provided by 
the Defendant and the memoranda of the parties, A review of the 
transcript reveals the testimony of Detective Wester, the State's 
sole witness to be as follows: 
1. Detective Wester was employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Department, assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit. (Tr. 1) 
2. Detective Wester had received training regarding clandestine 
laboratories. (Tr. 2) 
3. That a search warrant had been obtained to search 5386 West 
Silverton Drive, in Salt Lake County, because the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Department had received information that there was a 
possible meth lab and drug dealing at that address (Tr. 2) 
4. Defendant, Kathy Hall, was one of the people, who was identified 
in the search warrant and/or the affidavit in support of search 
warrant and was a primary target of the investigation. (Tr. 3) 
5. Defendant lived in the home and occupied a downstairs bedroom. 
Defendant's 13-year old daughter lived in the home and occupied an 
upstairs bedroom. Defendant's sister also lived in the home and 
occupied a downstairs bedroom, 
6. The* 13-year old daughter was mobile and apparently had access to 
all portions of the house, including the rooms where the items were 
found. (Tr. 4 and 5) 
7. In defendant's bedroom, the officers located a glass pipe, 
wrapped in tissue paper, on a closet shelf. Detective Wester 
testified that it was the type "used to ingest methamphetamine, " 
and it had been used, had burn marks on it, and a white smokey 
residue inside. (Tr. 5, 15, and 16) 
8. Detective Wester testified that the 13-year old was tall enough 
that she could reach the glass pipe on the closet shelf. (Tr. 6) 
9. The officers found me thamphet amine, scales, packaging material, 
and pseufederin pills in the sister's downstairs bedroom. (Tr. 6 
and 7) [Pseufederin is apparently a type of legal cold medicine 
that can be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. ] The 
me thamphetamine; scales, and packaging material were found inside 
transparent shelves in the defendant's sister's bedroom. (Tr. 6) 
10. Inside a detached garage, Detective Wester testified that they 
found "debris from the methamphetamine laboratory." Detective 
Wester when asked what items were found in the garage testified: 
"There were bottles of Heat, empty bottles of Heat, there was black 
tape that is used to connect pipes, there were stained rubber 
gloves and there was an overwhelming odor of a Methamphetamine 
Lab." (Tr. 7) . Detective Wester testified that Heat is used in the 
process to manufacture Methamphetamine. Heat is used to separate 
the efederin from pseufederin pills, like those found in the 
downstairs bedroom occupied by defendant's sister, Theresa 
Albretsen. (Tr. 7) 
The magistrate must view the evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing in the light most favorable to the State and 
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. At the 
preliminary hearing, the State must show probable cause to believe 
that the crime of Child Endangerment was committed and probable 
cause to believe that the Defendant was the person who committed 
that crime. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the State and in drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
State, the Court believes that the State has met those burdens. The 
Court concludes that there is probable cause to believe that the 
crime of Child Endangerment was committed and that there is 
probable cause to believe that the Defendant committed that crime. 
Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover/Declare Statute 
Unconstitutional is denied. 
Counsel for Plaintiff to prepare the Order. 
Dated this /f) day of April, 2 006. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 041100373FS 
Honorable Robert Adkins 
Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover and Declare U.C.A. § 76-5-112.5 
Unconstitutional and Memorandum in Support thereof had a preliminary hearing on 
October 28, 2004, in which Defendant was represented by counsel, Shannon Romero. 
The State filed its Response to the same, in which the State was represented by counsel, 
R. Josh Player. The Court having reviewed the attorney's legal briefs, the preliminary 
transcripts, and reviewed the relevant case law now enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Detective Wester was employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department, 
assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit. Detective Wester has received 
training regarding clandestine laboratories 
2. A search warrant had been obtained to search 5386 West Silverton Drive, in Salt 
Lake County, because the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department had received 
information that there was a possible meth lab and drug dealing at that address. 
3. Defendant, Kathy Hall, was one of the people who was identified in the search 
warrant and/or the affidavit in support of the search warrant and was a primary 
target of the investigation. 
4. Defendant lived in the home and occupied a downstairs bedroom. Defendant's 
13-year-old daughter lived in the home and occupied an upstairs bedroom. 
Defendant's sister, Theresa Albretsen, also lived in the home and occupied a 
downstairs bedroom. 
5. The 13-year-old daughter was mobile and apparently had access to all portions of 
the house, including rooms where the items were found. 
6. In Defendant's bedroom, the officers located a glass pipe wrapped in tissue paper 
on a closet shelf. Detective Wester testified that it was the type "used to ingest 
methamphetamine," and it had been used, as evidenced by the burn marks on it 
as well as a white smoky residue on the inside. 
7. Detective Wester testified that Defendant's 13-year-old daughter was tall enough 
to reach the glass pipe on the closet shelf 
8. The officers found methamphetamine, scales, packaging material, and a single 
package of pseudoephederine pills in Albretsen's downstairs bedroom. 
Pseudoephederine is a type of legal cold medicine that can be used in the 
manufacture of methamphetamine. The methamphetamine, scales, and 
packaging material were found inside transparent storage drawers in Albretsen's 
bedroom. 
9. Inside a detached garage, Detective Wester testified that they found "debris from 
the methamphetamine laboratory." When asked what items he found in the 
garage, Detective Wester testified, "There were bottles of Heet, empty bottles of 
Heet, there was black tape that is used to connect pipes, there were stained rubber 
gloves and there was an overwhelming odor of a methamphetamine lab." 
Detective Wester testified that Heet is used in the process to manufacture 
methamphetamine. Heet is used to separate the Ephederine from 
pseudoephederine pills, like those found in the downstairs bedroom occupied by 
Defendant's sister, Theresa Albretsen. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Utah Court of Appeals has found the statute, U.C.A. § 76-5-112.5, to be 
constitutional. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to find the child 
endangerment statute unconstitutional is denied. 
2. The magistrate must view the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing in the 
light most favorable to the State and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the State. At the preliminary hearing, the State must show probable cause to 
believe that the crime of Child Endangerment was committed and probable cause 
that the defendant was the person who committed that crime. 
3. la viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the State, and in drawing all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the State, the Court concludes that the State has 
met those burdens. 
4. There is probable cause to believe that the crime of Child Endangemient was 
committed and there is probable cause to believe that Defendant committed that 
crime. 
5. Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover and Declare U.C.A. § 76-5-112.5 
unconstitutional is denied. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FILED 
UTAH APPFI.LATE GOI ^ 
JUN 0 7 2006 
-ooOoo-
Kathy H a l l , 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
v . 
S t a t e of Utah , 
Respondent, 
ORDER 
Case No. 20060407-CA 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne. 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is granted. 
DATED this 7 day of June, 2006, 
FOR THE COURT: 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judg 
ADDENDUM C 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
76-5-112.5. Endangerment of child or elder adult. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intended to be used as a 
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other 
chemical intended to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance. 
Intent under this subsection maybe demonstrated by the substance's use, 
quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to 
manufacturing equipment. 
(b) "Child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection. 
76-5-109(l)(a). 
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as tha t te rm is defined in 
Section 58-37a-3. 
(e) "Elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
76-5-111. 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers bodily injury, 
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of, 
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of the second degree unless the 
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child or 
elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the 
controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for the child or 
elder adult, and t h a t it was administered to the child or elder adult in 
accordance with the prescription instructions provided with the controlled 
substance. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has the same definition 
as in Section 58-37-2. 
ADDENDUM D 
1 MALE: Number 159 the 28 (inaudible) donated one day absence you'll 
2 (inaudible) dangerous. 
3 FEMALE: Senate bill 188 potential for children and elderly Pete Swazzle (?) 
4 this was hurting law enforcement of criminal justice with a vote of eight yes, zero no, 
5 three absent. 
6 MR. SPEAKER: (Inaudible) you are again. 
7 MALE3: I would move to circle that place. 
8 MR. SPEAKER: Motion to circle Senate Bill one, excuse me, (inaudible) Cox 
9 are you prepared to address this bill? 
10 COX: I would withdraw my motion. 
11 MR. SPEAKER: (Inaudible) to withdraw the motion representative. Okay the 
12 bill has been read in and we'll go to representative Cox for presentation of Senate Bill 
13 188. 
14 COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Potan. I appreciate the opportunity to present this 
15 bill to you. What this basically does is changes the penalties re, related to operating a 
16 Clandestine uh, drug lab that presents significant risks of injury or even potential death to 
17 children, or to the elderly who might uh, be forced actually to live in those conditions. 
18 Uh, if this bill is passed it would be a third degree felony to recklessly or knowingly or 
19 intentionally cause or permit a child or an elderly person to suffer bodily injury from 
20 exposure to a controlled substance, a chemical substance or to drug paraphernalia. The 
1 
1 second degree felony if there were actually harm caused by the exposure to the illegal 
2 substances. Excuse me. It would be a first degree felony if that child or elderly person 
3 died because of the exposure. It's fairly simple in nature. It's uh, supported by the, the 
4 prosecutor's association, attorney general's office and uh, youth and family specialists 
5 that uh, work in this arena. I'm open for questions. 
6 MR. SPEAKER: Discussion to the bill, representative Bush. 
7 BUSH: May I question the sponsor? 
8 MR. SPEAKER: Sponsor yield? 
9 MALE: Yes. 
10 MR. SPEAKER: Yes you may proceed. 
11 BUSH: What's the, what's the definition of elderly? 
12 MALE: The same, the same definition that is already in statute 
13 representative. 
14 BUSH: What is it? 
15 MALE: I don't know. Nobody wants to say either. 
16 BUSH: Just don't, just don't do anything harmful to me. 
17 MALE: It's line, it's line 52 in the uh, in the bill. Elder adult means the same 
18 as that term defined in Section 76-5-111. I don't have that opened right now. 
19 MR. SPEAKER: To the bill, representative Dillary? 
20 DILLARY: Uh yes my question is there's no fiscal note on the bill and under 
2 
000 
1 normal circumstances when we increase uh, penalties or enhance uh, bring on a new 
2 felony or something this would involve incarceration and there would be a, a financial 
3 impact. 
4 MALE: We (inaudible) 
5 MR. SPEAKER: Did you want him to yield the question? 
6 DILLARY: Yes, 
7 MR. SPEAKER: Okay. 
8 DILLARY: I want him to address why there isn't one. 
9 MR. SPEAKER: (Inaudible) Cox will you yield? 
10 COX: Yes. 
11 MR. SPEAKER: Yes, go ahead. 
12 COX: Thank you. Fiscal analysts indicated this could be done with in current 
13 budgets. 
14 DILLARY: That's a first. 
15 MR. SPEAKER: Thank you representative Wright to the bill. 
16 WRIGHT: Thank you would sponsor yield? 
17 MALE: I'll try. 
18 WRIGHT: Representative Cox 
19 MR. SPEAKER: (inaudible) you may proceed. 
20 WRIGHT: You say we enhance the penalties, what, what were they previously 
3 
1 and what are the enhancing to? 
2 COX: ...Anywhere from uh, misdemeanors to third degree felonies. 
3 WRIGHT: Previously to now so this, this makes all these third degree felonies 
4 and what, what's the difference I guess. 
5 COX: No. The difference now is that if the bi, if the individual creates that urn, 
6 that condition, that and they do that recklessly, knowingly or intentionally, uh cause or 
7 permit a child or an elderly person to suffer bodily injury from exposure to those 
8 substances, be a second degree felony if there was actual harm caused. If death resulted 
9 as, as a result of that condition then it's a first degree felony. 
10 WRIGHT: So what would be the penalty for just having a drug lab now? 
11 COX: It's just a misdemeanor for just having a uh, lab. 
12 WRIGHT: So it still would be a misdemeanor except we just, uh, and I su, I 
13 support you know what we're trying to do but I'm wondering why, why don't we just 
14 raise the penalties for having the drug lab in the first place. What, what you did was 
15 actually if you had bodily harm, so you have to prove some type of bodily harm and then 
16 it enhances the penalty rather then 
17 COX: If, if there's, if there's actual cause of injury or death it enhances the 
18 penalty, yes. 
19 WRIGHT: The question I would have is this a good way, why don't we just 
20 raise the penalty for a drug lab? You know maybe I'm a little naive for having it in the 
4 
1 first place, whether we 
2 MALE: I, I think that's another bill that uh, representative uh, Tyler has 
3 worked on quite a bit. 
4 WRIGHT: Okay. Thank you. 
5 MR. SPEAKER: Thank you for the discussions representative Dayton. 
6 DAYTON: Thank you Mr. Speaker, will sponsor yield? 
7 MR. SPEAKER: Will the sponsor yield? 
8 MALE: Absolutely. 
9 MR. SPEAKER Yes you may proceed. 
10 DAYTON: I, I'd like to pursue the questions that representative Wright had only 
11 because um, somewhere between child and elderly, um there are a lot of people that don't 
12 know about meth labs or even the danger that's involved in them and I'm uh, presuming 
13 the way the bill is written is if a child or an elderly person wouldn't be able to remove 
14 themselves from a situation, but, but a lot of people wouldn't, wouldn't know to. Until it 
15 was too late, um, I'm, I'm just confused about that, would you ad, address that concern? 
16 MALE: These are, these are the people that are vulnerable that generally 
17 don't have the choice, they're, they either don't have a choice because they're too young 
18 or they're frightened, not able to leave, uh, their own children will be ere, creating the 
19 hazard in their home and they're concerned about being able to have anywhere else to go, 
20 um, because they have nowhere else to go. 
5 
1 DAYTON: Thank you. 
2 MR. SPEAKER: For the discussion of the bill representative CURTIS. 
3 CURTIS: Thank you Mr. Speaker, I would like to reserve the right to make a 
4 motion. 
5 MR. SPEAKER: You made (inaudible) and reserve that right. 
6 CURTIS: Thank you Mr. Speaker and will the sponsor yield to a question? 
7 MR. SPEAKER: Do you yield representative Cox? 
8 COX: Reluctantly. 
9 MR. SPEAKER: You may proceed. 
10 CURTIS: Um, it appears that in the a committee that, well it appears that the 
11 original intent of the bill was to go after intentional cont, con, conduct, um and the 
12 committee knowing or intentional conduct, the committee edited the criminal copeability 
13 standard of reckless, recklessly exposing somebody. Could you help me understand, 
14 what, why uh, they were going in that direction? 
15 MALE: I think that's consistent with other, with language in other crimes. 
16 That they recklessly, knowingly or intentionally, that, that's consistent with the criminal 
17 code you're quite aware of that. 
18 CURTIS: Well it's not consistent, representatives, if Mr. Speaker if I could 
19 place my motion to amend. 
20 MR. SPEAKER: You may proceed. 
6 
1 CURTIS: On the golden rod copy line 53,1 would simply move to delete 
2 recklessly, and if I may speak to that. 
3 MR. SPEAKER: You may, uh, let me repeat that, on, on the golden rod copy 
4 line 53 we delete the word recklessly. 
5 CURTIS: Yes. 
6 MR. SPEAKER: Okay you may proceed with explanation. 
7 CURTIS: Thank you uh, Mr. Speaker. Representatives in the criminal code 
8 there's a, there's a chapter entitled Chapter 2 which is principles of criminal 
9 responsibility and then copeability is defined and you have a generally four standards of 
10 criminal copeability. You have an intentional, a knowingly, a reckless or with criminal 
11 negligence. And what we've done here in this bill is we've elevated the penalties, and 
12 we've taken three of the four criminal standards of copeability. I think if somebody 
13 intentionally or knowingly exposes somebody to these chemicals that they should have 
14 some elevated principles, elevated copeability, but a reckless exposure to then say we're 
15 going to elevate it, not every crime is as a reckless crime. When representative Cox says 
16 well, I, I am familiar with the criminal code and that's why you have different levels of, 
17 you have homicide, and you have manslaughter, and you have negligent homicide and 
18 you have different levels based upon the copeability, but we've lumped all the 
19 copeability together and elevated the penalties. I'm asking to take that one level of 
20 copeability off and a reckless standard saying we did an intentional and knowingly and 
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1 uncomfortable with elevating the standard. But I'm not comfortable in elevating the 
2 penalty if we're going to lower the standards to. 
3 MR. SPEAKER: Representative Cox response to motion to amend? 
4 COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Protam. I'd resist the motion, uh, this was 
5 recommended by the prosecutors. You got to recognize that when these individuals that 
6 have created this situation, this dangerous, dangerous situation, oft times they are under 
7 the influence of the drug themselves and what they do they do recklessly. We need to 
8 hold them copeable. We need to hold them accountable for that. And it should be at a 
9 higher level because of the danger that they're placing these small children and these 
10 elderly adults in. It's worthy of an elevated penalty. And I'd resist the motion on that. 
11 MR. SPEAKER: Further discussion to the motion to amend. Seeing none, 
12 representative Curtis for summation on your motion. 
13 CURTIS: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I agree with representative Cox, it's worthy 
14 of an elevated penalty. It's not worthy of a lower standard of copeability. There's a 
15 distinction and there's a difference and when you as, and when you go in to do establish 
16 how somebody did something if you're driving negligently and you kill somebody that's 
17 different then if you intentionally kill somebody. What we're doing is we're lumping all 
18 the standards of copeability together to get an elevated penalty. And I (tape went out). 
19 Thank you. 
20 MR. SPEAKER: We'll place the motion to amend. The amendment is on the 
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1 golden rod copy line 53 we delete the word recklessly. All in favor of the motion to 
2 amend say I. 
3 GROUP: I 
4 MR. SPEAKER: Opposed no. 
5 GROUP: No. 
6 MR. SPEAKER: Sheriff rules, the motion carries. Five or more standing? 
7 Five or more standing be in division. Voting is open.... Having voted we'll close the 
8 vote. Voting will be closed. Motion to Amend having received 39 yes notes and 24 no 
9 votes passes. Good ears as usual. Further discussion to the bill. Seeing none, 
10 representative Cox for summation on the bill. 
L1 COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Potan. Law enforcement has been working very 
12 hard to clean up the meth labs in our communities. This provides them with the 
13 opportunity, a better tool to do that, to be better enforcers of the laws that we as a body 
14 have enacted. Uh, I'd appreciate your positive vote on this bill. 
15 MR. SPEAKER: Thank you, voting is open on Senate Bill 188.... Seeing all 
16 present having voted we'll close the vote. Senate Bill 188 having received 67 yes votes 
17 and 0 no votes will be returned to the senate for further action. Representative Norris 
18 Stevens.
 I t ^ _ _ - ^ f 
19 FEMALE: House Bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with 
20 controlled substance or precursor Trisha Beck. This was heard in judiciary with a vote of 
9 
1 9 yes and 0 no 4 absent. 
2 MR. SPEAKER: Representative Beck. 
3 BECK: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Urn, actually there were two oversights 
4 either section dealing with endangerment of a child or an elder adult and this bill merely 
5 corrects those oversights from the problems. The first problem is that the section 
6 contains an all court proof requirement. It's obviously intended to cover the situation 
7 where a person knowingly and intentionally gives a child or elder adult a controlled 
8 substance and there by exposes him of or her to injury. This section should have simply 
9 made it illegal to expose them to a non-prescribed controlled substance. Obviously they 
10 have already determined that the controlled substances are risky to an individual's health, 
11 otherwise they would not be a controlled substance. The same is true with the drug 
12 paraphernalia and chemicals used to making illegal drugs. The current language 
13 unintentionally requires the prosecutor to present scientific evidence to show that the 
14 controlled substances are dangerous. That's not only expensive but it's also ridiculous to 
15 spend all their time trying to show that. The other oversight in this section is that it 
16 contains no exceptions for drugs which are administered in accordance with the 
17 prescription from a (inaudible) physician. This bill also fixes that problem as it says in 
18 the last two paragraphs. So this also urn, passed through the committee, um on it as a 
19 consensus bill, as on, it passed through the committee unanimously. So with that, that 
20 I'm open for any questions. 
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1 MR. SPEAKER: Discussion to House Bill 125. See no lights. Uh, voting is 
2 open on House Bill 125.... Sorry about that. Representative Beck waives summation. 
3 It's obviously getting late.... Seeing all present, representative Murray, representative 
4 Addaire, Senurey, Senior, Senate Bowman, I think the time's getting near, representative 
5 Hanson, seeing all present and having voted Senate Bowman. Voting will be closed. 
6 House Bill 125 having received 71 yes votes 0 no votes passes this body and referred to 
7 the Senate for further consideration. Madam Reading Clerk. 
8 MALE: Senate Bill 188 ' ^ 
9 FEMALE: Senate Bill 188 protection for children and elderly, Senator Swazzle. 
10 MALE: Senator Swazzle. 
11 SWAZZLE: And thank you Ms. President, uh this bill uh, as we discussed 
12 yesterday addresses a very serious issue and that is the production of methamphetamines. 
13 This bill would uh, put in place a series of penalties for those clandestine drug operators 
14 as they manufacture these uh, illegal drugs and would put in place a penalty of a third 
15 degree if they knowingly or intentionally cause or permit a child or elder to suffer bodily 
16 injury. Second degree felony if they actually are harmed and a first degree felony if that 
17 child or elder actually dies as a result of those illegal substances. 
18 MALE: Questions for Senator Swazzle. (Inaudible) questions being called. 
19 Senate Bill 188 pass roll call. 
20 FEMALE: (inaudible) Ellett 
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1 ELLETT: I 
2 FEMALE: Blackham, 
3 BLACKHAM I 
4 FEMALE: Davis... Demetris 
5 DEMETRIS: I 
6 FEMALE: Bev Evans... Bart Evans 
7 BART EVANS: I 
8 FEMALE: Vel 
9 VEL: I 
10 FEMALE: Callowell 
11 CALLOWELL: I 
12 FEMALE: Villiard 
13 VILLIARD: I 
14 FEMALE: Al 
15 AL: I 
16 FEMALE: Holt 
17 HOLT: I 
18 FEMALE: Jones 
19 JONES: I 
20 FEMALE: Julander... Knutsen 
K N U T S E N : I 
2 F E M A L E : D e n s e l . . . Ma ine 
3 M A I N E : I 
4 F E M A L E : M o n t g o m e r y 
5 M O N T G O M E R Y : I 
6 F E M A L E : Nielstein 
7 NIELSTEIN: I 
8 F E M A L E : Nie l sen 
9 NIELSEN: I 
[0 FEMALE: Peterson 
L I P E T E R S O N : I 
L2 F E M A L E : Knowl ton 
13 K N O W L T O N : I 
L4 F E M A L E : Stanford . . . Steele 
L5 STEELE: I 
[6 FEMALE: Stevenson 
17 S T E V E N S O N : I 
18 F E M A L E : Swazz le 
19 S W A Z Z L E : I 
10 F E M A L E : Valen t ine 
1 VALENTINE: I 
2 FEMALE: Waddit 
3 WADDIT: I 
4 FEMALE: (inaudible) Bailey 
5 BAILEY: I 
6 MALE: Senate Bill 188 has 27 I votes, no nay votes two being absent 
7 Passes to the third reading count. Excuse me, passes to the house for their consideration. 
8 Next bill sub 
•Ha>tse^VLU i 7 - < r / ^ - T ^ D^^^T^S ( M ^ ^ M S"y2-c*>^) 
9 MR. PRESIDENT: (inaudible) House Bill 125. J 
10 FEMALE: House Bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with 
11 controlled substance or precursor representative Beck, Senator Julander. 
12 MR PRESIDENT: Senator Julander. 
13 JULANDER: Thank you Mr. President, we've had uh, several discussions 
14 on this bill and we're trying to correct two oversights that had been in the uh, code um, to 
15 the present. The first problem was, was the awkward proof of requirement and we solved 
16 that yesterday with Senator uh, Valentines amendment, uh and um, the other was the um, 
17 the section that contains no exemption for drugs which are, are administered in 
18 accordance with the prescription from a physician. So unless there are any questions. 
19 MR. PRESIDENT: Any questions for Senator Julander on this bill? ... See non 
20 Senator. 
14 
1 JULANDER: (inaudible) with the question that uh, 
2 MR PRESIDENT: Question is should House Bill 125 pass? Roll call vote. 
3 FEMALE: Senator Allen .. Ron Allen 
4 ALLEN: I 
5 FEMALE: Blancum.. (inaudible) 
6 MALE: I 
7 FEMALE: Brothers 
8 BROTHERS: I 
9 FEMALE: Davis 
10 DAVIS: 1 
11 FEMALE: Demitrige 
12 DEMITRIGE: I 
13 FEMALE: Eastman 
14 EASTMAN: I 
15 FEMALE: Ericks 
16 ERICKS: I 
17 FEMALE: Gregra 
18 GREGRA: 1 
19 FEMALE: Hale... Halerow 
20 HALEROW: I 
15 
1 FEMALE: Hickman ...Hillyard 
2 HILLYARD: I 
3 FEMALE: Jokums 
4 JOKUMA: I 
5 FEMALE: Julander 
6 JULANDER: I 
7 FEMALE: Knudson 
8 KNUDSON: I 
9 FEMALE: Maine 
10 MAINE: I 
11 FEMALE: Peterson 
12 PETERSON: I 
13 FEMALE: Polton 
14 POLTON: I 
15 FEMALE: Spencer 
16 SPENCER: I 
17 FEMALE: Steele 
18 STEELE: I 
19 FEMALE: Stevenson 
20 STEVENSON: I 
1 FEMALE: Swazzle 
2 SWAZZLE: I 
3 FEMALE: Valentine 
4 VALENTINE: I 
5 FEMALE: Claudertz 
6 CLAUDERTZ: I 
7 FEMALE: Walker 
8 WALKER: I 
9 FEMALE Wright 
0 WRIGHT: I 
1 FEMALE: (inaudible) 
2 MALE: I 
.3 MR. PRESIDENT: House Bill 125 is received 261 votes no nay votes three being 
[4 absent, passes. Will be referred back to the House for further consideration as it was 
15 amended. We'll now go to 
17 
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